A Chinese Perspective on the Path to Nuclear Disarmament

Alison Williams, Wimbledon CND Disarmament Coalition, reports on a Pugwash webinar featuring Zhou Bo, on 8 October 2024.

Pugwash-UK had a speaker well qualified to report on this topic: Zhou Bo had been a Colonel in the Army, in charge of Arms Control in the Civil Service and he is now an academic; a Senior Fellow at the Centre for International Strategy and Security in Beijing. 

In the wider context of the Chinese approach to Nuclear Disarmament he spoke most about their commitment to a No First Use policy.  He accepts that a nuclear ban is not going to be globally effective short-term and that amid growing competition and modernisation Nuclear Weapon States will not reduce their arsenals. That being so, China argues that a “No First Use” policy would be the most realistic way to reduce nuclear threats. 

He said there are two myths about China’s nuclear policy: first that they don’t want to talk about it and second that the US needs to be prepared for a nuclear conflict against the combined forces of China, Russia and North Korea.  That American “Nuclear Employment Guidance” he regarded as “completely ridiculous”. 

He thinks strategic stability would be achieved by a “trust and verify” policy for Cyber, AI and Outer Space as well as nuclear weapons. A No First Use pledge would allow a state to take the moral high ground without limiting its capacity for retaliation   And the policies of America, France and Britain are not far from China’s as things stand: America would only consider using nuclear weapons “in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or its allies and partners”; the UK “in extreme circumstances of self-defence, including the defence of NATO allies”  and France would adhere to a policy of “strict sufficiency”. 

Among the UN’s P5 countries he sees Russia posing the greatest challenge because deterrence seemed to be working: faced with Putin’s nuclear-use threats the US imposed strict limits on Ukraine’s use of American weapons. But it would be suicidal for North Korea to attack US partners (South Korea, the Philippines and Japan) given the fallout that would impact the region including itself. 

Zhou Bo suggests a two-track approach.  In Europe NATO could make a unilateral No First Use pledge against Russia as a gesture of goodwill.  And in exchange for Russia adopting a No First Use policy they could pledge no further expansion of their alliance. At present only Bosnia-Herzegovina, Georgia and Ukraine are on the waiting list and their entry into NATO would bring more trouble than benefit anyway. In Asia Russia and China already have a mutual No First Use agreement. The US and China could have the same arrangement and thereby de-escalate potential conflicts with US allies in the region.

History suggests that mutual diplomatic agreements can work – for example Non-targeting, a symbolic sign of goodwill.  In 2000 all the P5 countries agreed not to target weapons on one another.  Non-targeting is not verifiable but he thinks that it could be the next step beyond a No First Use commitment.

To those who object that China’s No First Use promotion is a diplomatic ploy he responds why can’t everyone adopt that ploy?  It would be morally binding because it is clearly verifiable. And if we are all agreed that a nuclear war cannot be won why can’t we all pledge No First Use?

Listen to Pugwash Zhou Bo’s Pugwash webinar here

 

Activists rally to say “No US Nukes at Lakenheath!”

This article was originally written for Labour Outlook by Christine Shawcroft

An intrepid group of peace campaigners totally repulsed a missile attack from Donald Trump, Kamala Harris and Joe Biden at Lakenheath airbase in Suffolk on 2nd November. Unfortunately, the missiles were cardboard and the American politicians (or crook in one case) were CND supporters with face masks on.

The dramatized battle, choreographed and presented by CND’s new general secretary, Sophie Bolt, was fun, but with a serious message: we are all in danger from the proposal to return US missiles to the Lakenheath airbase.

The rally outside RAF (more accurately, USAF) Lakenheath was well supported by London Region CND and local groups including Nottingham, Leicester, Norwich and elsewhere, as well as the Lakenheath Alliance for Peace. Local speakers explained that the noise from the jets at the base is deafening; people living in the vicinity can’t use their gardens or open their windows in the summer – and are even reluctant to let their children play outdoors!

Melissa Parke, Executive Director of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) travelled to Lakenheath from her home in Geneva, Switzerland, to join us. Focussing on nuclear dangers in Europe, she emphasised the need for peace in Ukraine. ICAN is the organisation that won the 2017 Nobel Peace Prize for its work promoting the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, adopted by the UN in July 2017.

Other excellent contributions included Kirsten Bayes Campaign Against Arms Trade, Green Party peer Jenny Jones and former Green MEP Catherine Rowett. Peter Burt from Nukewatch outlined the shameful history of nukes at Lakenheath, including some near-miss nuclear accidents. Bimal Khadka from MedAct, described the work of Don’t Bank on the Bomb UK, and played a harrowing soundtrack of what happens when a nuclear bomb is detonated.

We were told that the UK government spends billions every year on contracts to companies like Babcock International, Lockheed Martin, Rolls Royce and BAE systems – over the past five years, British spending on nuclear weapons rose by a staggering 43%, and the present government is pledged to raise it still further. The companies involved are also funded through investments made by banks and financial institutions. Your pension fund might be funding weapons of mass destruction.

Planes from Lakenheath have been involved in joint exercises with Israeli and Saudi air forces as well as being deployed in the Middle East as part of NATO forces. The F35 planes cost £58 million, and when flying costs £28,000 an hour. On a ‘normal’ day there are between 15-30 flights a day from the base, but during exercises and military interventions that number massively increases. Militarism is also very bad news for the climate. Around 6% of global greenhouse gases come directly from military activity. Nuclear weapons sites have contaminated land and water with radioactive waste which is lethal for at least 100,000 years.

Lakenheath Peace Alliance described the camp and its work, musicians and singers entertained us, and CND Vice Chair Carol Turner, concluded proceedings with a mercifully short speech on what was an overcast and drizzling day.

Finally, I noticed a sign on the gate saying that tobacco is prohibited on the base apart from in a few designated areas. Because, of course, tobacco is very bad for your health, but nuclear weapons will bring us peace and freedom!

Budget 2024: Military budget continues to grow faster than peace building and overseas aid spending

After the Budget was published on 30 October 2024, the following analysis was published by the Global Campaign on Military Spending UK

Summary

In the government’s Autumn Budget, the UK’s core military spending rose to £56.9bn this financial year – 2024-25 – with an additional £2.9bn announced for next year. This means that this military spending is rising at an annual rate of 2.3% above inflation. While the government is still committed to eventually reaching a spending level of 2.5% GDP, it continues to avoid setting a target date. Core military spending is 4.3 times the budget for overseas aid - which is mainly managed by the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office - and 5.5 times the budget of the Department of Energy Security and Net Zero – which includes most climate-related spending. The government continues to fail to meet the UN target on overseas aid, while climate action also remains seriously inadequate.

In more depth…

The Autumn Budget 2024 (AB24)[1] – the first by the new Labour government – revealed that the UK’s core military spending[2] reached £56.9 billion in the financial year 2024-25.[3] This is £3.0bn higher than in 2023-24, and £5.2bn higher than the previous Conservative government had projected for this year in its Spring Budget 2024 (SB24)[4] – see Table 1. This very large spending gap seems to be another element of the much discussed ‘£22bn black hole’ in the government’s finances. The new government has also announced an additional £2.9bn for military spending in 2025-26 bringing the total expected for that year to £59.8bn. Over the period 2023-26, the annual rise will be 2.3% above inflation.

Table 1 – A comparison of core military spending for 2023-26 as stated in Autumn Budget 2024 (AB24)[5] and the Spring Budget 2024 (SB24)[6]

The UK was the sixth largest military spender in the world in 2023[8] - and it is likely to retain a high spot after this budget settlement. The government repeated its aim to reach a level for military spending of 2.5% Gross Domestic Product (GDP), but continued to avoid setting a date.[9] This aspiration is well above the NATO target of 2.0% GDP.

Of the extra £2.9bn in 2025-26, £1.9bn will be for investment in new military equipment, with the remaining £1.0bn being for day-to-day costs. No specific information is given about which equipment programmes will receive the extra funding, but the programme for replacing Britain’s nuclear-armed submarines is currently running well over-budget,[10] so this is one of the most likely destinations.

The government has also made a commitment to provide £3bn per year indefinitely for military assistance to Ukraine,[11] an increase over previous years. Statements by the previous government revealed that the UK was spending nearly nine times as much on military support than on humanitarian aid to the country.[12]

The core figures also do not include some other areas of military spending, in particular, veterans’ pensions, which are not directly related to current government policies on the armed forces. If all these other categories are included, the total spending by the Ministry of Defence is £83bn.[13]

Comparing core military spending with other civilian budgets continues to be revealing, as follows.

●      In 2024-25, core military spending was 4.3 times the overseas aid budget,[14] which is mainly managed by the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office. It is especially worrying that the government is to continue not meeting the UN target to spend 0.7% of Gross National Income (GNI) on overseas aid, while still being committed to exceeding its NATO military spending target. This undermines Britain’s contribution to helping to meet the UN Sustainable Development Goals, including efforts to eradicate international poverty and hunger. The failure of the international community to properly fund these efforts is costing millions of lives each year.

●      In 2024-25, core military spending was 5.5 times the budget of the Department of Energy Security and Net Zero – which is responsible for much of the government spending on reducing carbon emissions. With Britain having fallen behind on climate action under the previous government, and global temperature rise currently projected to breach the Paris target of 1.5C by 2031,[15] this is an area which has required much greater priority. Since the general election, there have been several announcements on new funding and projects, but climate scientists have questioned whether some of them will actually be effective.[16] The government does not have a spending target for climate action, so it continues to be difficult to judge how far short expenditure is in this area.

●      In 2024-25, core military spending was 8.0 times the budget of the Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs – which includes spending on nature protection. With biodiversity loss at critical levels, this is an area that also needs much greater funding.

In summary, despite a new government coming to power, the UK’s commitment to high military spending is undimmed – especially when compared to key areas such as overseas aid and climate action.

Dr Stuart Parkinson is Chair of GCOMS-UK and Executive Director of Scientists for Global Responsibility.

References

[1] HM Treasury (2024a). Autumn Budget 2024. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/autumn-budget-2024

[2] Core military spending is expenditure by the Ministry of Defence under its ‘resource’ and ‘capital’ budgets. It excludes certain other military budget lines as discussed in the main text.

[3] All figures in this briefing are calculated from those on pp.35-38 of HM Treasury (2024a) – except where otherwise indicated.

[4] pp.25-27 of: HM Treasury (2024b). Spring Budget 2024. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/spring-budget-2024

[5] As note 3.

[6] As note 4.

[7] ‘Current prices’ means that there has been no adjustment for inflation.

[8] SIPRI (2024). Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2023. April. https://www.sipri.org/publications/2024/sipri-fact-sheets/trends-world-military-expenditure-2023

[9] p.55 of: HM Treasury (2024a).

[10] National Audit Office (2023). Ministry of Defence: The Equipment Plan 2023 to 2033. December. https://www.nao.org.uk/reports/equipment-plan-2023-to-2033/

[11] p.55 of: HM Treasury (2024a).

[12] GCOMS-UK (2024). Spring budget 24: Military spending continues to grow at the expense of climate funds and overseas aid. 7 March. https://demilitarize.org.uk/spring-budget-24-military-spending-continues-to-grow-at-the-expense-of-climate-funds-and-overseas-aid/

[13] p.164 of: HM Treasury (2024a).

[14] Calculated using figures from pp.87-88 of: HM Treasury (2024a).

[15] Climate Change Tracker (2024). Indicators of Global Climate Change. 29 October.  https://climatechangetracker.org/igcc

[16] The Guardian (2024). Climate scientists call on Labour to pause £1bn plans for carbon capture. 25 September. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2024/sep/25/climate-scientists-call-on-labour-to-pause-1bn-investment-plans-carbon-capture-blue-hydrogen