Push for de-escalation as danger of nuclear conflict escalates

As the war in Ukraine continues and escalations risk a much wider war, London Region CND Chair Carol Turner wrote the below article for Labour Outlook on the need for de-escalation.

The call by President Zelensky to be allowed to use long-range cruise missiles supplied by its NATO allies deep within Russian territory posed an imminent threat of a Europe-wide war between nuclear armed states. The announcement by Prime Minister Starmer, that talks with President Biden resulted in no decision permitting Ukraine to do so is a welcome though temporary respite in this rapidly escalating conflict.

In a statement at the end of the talks, Starmer reiterated his ‘ongoing’ and ‘unequivocal’ support for Ukraine, and emphasised the discussion had been ‘productive’ and concentrated on ‘strategy’, rather than a ‘particular step or tactic’. The White House issued a similar statement. Behind the scenes, the talks also signal the UK government is positioning itself to become the NATO lead amongst European allies. This will put Britain on the front line.

This current phase of the Ukraine conflict started on 7 August when Ukraine launched a ground incursion into Russian territory for the first time, after the US and other NATO allies gave the go-ahead for weapons they’ve supplied to be used against military targets within Russia. This permission is needed because many of these weapons require access to guidance systems controlled by the US.

Russia responded to the August incursion with heavy bombardment of Ukraine’s second city, Kharkiv, and stepped-up its military action in the Donbas region. This prompted Zelensky to seek US and UK agreement for long-range cruise missiles, including the Anglo-French Storm Shadow system.

The summer escalation in the Ukraine war took place against the backdrop of a NATO Summit in July that signalled further steps towards ‘globalising’ the role of the North Atlantic Alliance –beyond its Euro-Atlantic axis, to further extend its growing presence in the Indo-Pacific. Note for example, increasing references to a Russia-China-Iran-North Korea axis, when discussing the Ukraine war. More tangible manifestations at the July Summit of globalisation the Alliance included:

• announcing plans for long-range US cruise missiles to be deployed periodically in Germany from 2026, and

• identifying China as the ‘decisive enabler’ of Russia’s military action in Ukraine.

Britain’s role

There can be little doubt that more calls to intensify the conflict will follow in the weeks and months ahead. The anti-war and labour movements must remain alert to the dangers of Ukraine becoming a Europe-wide war. Not only NATO but also Russia is preparing for this. In May, for example, Russia concluded an agreement to deploy tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus, the first deployment of Russian nuclear weapons outside its territory since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

Intensification of the war creates a particular danger for Britain. The UK recently agreed to become one of NATO’s European nuclear bases. Earlier this year, US nukes were cleared for delivery to locations in Europe. Lakenheath airbase in Suffolk already has the facilities needed to house them. The F-35 fighter bombers which will deliver them to their targets are already stationed at Lakenheath and pilots trained to fly them.

This not only puts Britain on the front line of a European war, it also makes us a direct target for retaliation. The situation remains extremely dangerous and should be treated as such.

Missile diplomacy

At present NATO and Russia are engaged in what might be termed missile diplomacy. In response to Zelensky’s threat of a long-range cruise missiles attack and the discussion taking place between the US and UK, President Putin said (quoting the English translation used by the BBC):

‘If this decision is made it will mean nothing other than direct participation by NATO countries, the United States and European countries, in the war in Ukraine. And this of course changes the very essence of the conflict. This will mean that NATO countries – the United States, European countries – are fighting with Russia.’

The Russian Ambassador to the UN has reiterated this.

Putin’s response has been widely interpreted in the West as a declaration of war by Russia. However, the English translation of Putin’s statement suggests his language is crafted to avoid making such a clear and definitive declaration.

The US and its NATO allies have both conventional and nuclear superiority over Russia, although the number of US and Russian nuclear warheads are approximately balanced. It must also be borne in mind that a direct military confrontation between Russia and NATO would be likely to prompt other states to engage on the side of Russa.

Divisions over strategy

The Biden administration was seen as divided over Ukraine’s proposal to escalate – unsurprisingly, perhaps, in the run up to a presidential election. It is already being pointed out that this doesn’t mean Ukraine won’t get the green light for Storm Shadow missiles in future, It does suggest though that the US would seek to take a back seat and, if the OK were to be given, Britain would likely take the lead.

The relentless war propaganda in the UK media and across Europe serves to cover growing unease amongst the movers and shakers – different assessments between NATO countries, as well as between military and political leaders.  

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz made a call to rekindle diplomatic efforts to end the war in Ukraine, for example, though Deutsche Welle Germany’s leading international broadcaster points out reception has been ‘muted’. Speaking on the BBC’s Sunday with Kuenssberg programme General Sir John McColl, former NATO Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe, said ‘the question of winning or losing is not something we will be able to achieve’. Ukraine will result in ‘some kind of  stalemated negotiations’.

The UK is particularly exposed and vulnerable to the dangers that a war in Europe between nuclear armed combatants presents. The crisis which loomed at the end of last week should leave us in no doubt of the immediate and urgent task for the anti-war movement which is to:

• alert the public to the real and present danger that intensifying the war in Ukraine brings

• put pressure on the UK government to encourage de-escalation, and

• step up the call for a ceasefire and negotiations before it’s too late.

Mutual Defence Agreement becomes a permanent nuclear pact

The new government has put forward an amendment to the Mutual Defence Agreement (MDA) which removes the need to renew it. Since the bilateral nuclear pact was first signed with the USA in 1958, the MDA has been brought before parliament for approval every 10 years. When the amended MDA – the Agreement for Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defence Purposes to give it its full title – is signed this year Britain’s nuclear sharing arrangement with the US becomes permanent.  

Amending the MDA was one of the Prime Minister’s first foreign policy initiatives. Defence Secretary John Healey presented amendments to parliament on 26 July, three weeks after Labour took office. No change in the law is needed for the MDA to become a permanent agreement. As CND General Secretary Kate Hudon observes ‘this spells farewell to even the smallest notion of parliamentary responsibility’ for Britain’s foreign and security policies.

In an explanatory memorandum Healey explained the MDA ‘provides the necessary requirements for the control and transmission of submarine nuclear propulsion technology, atomic information  and material between the UK and US, and the transfer of non-nuclear components to the UK’. A Freedom of Information request from the Nuclear Information Service reveals that 955 components were imported from the US between 2020-2023.

The MDA is the basis on which the US provides Britain with nuclear weapons materials and know-how without which Trident could not function. As Richard Norton Taylor rightly points out: ‘It gives the lie to persistent claims by the Ministry of Defence that Britain’s submarine-launched nuclear arsenal is “operationally independent”.’

In exchange for nuclear capability, Britain provides the US with intelligence facilities. Menwith Hill makes signals intelligence available to the US from across the norther hemisphere, intercepting  both military and commercial electronic communications. Fylingdales radar station is one of three that comprise the USA’s Ballistic Missile Early Warning System. Information from them initiates a nuclear response from the US or Britain to a perceived threat.

Healey’s memorandum also claims the MDA ‘is consistent with the UK's obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and commitments under the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban-Treaty’. It does not provide for ‘the transfer of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices’.

On the contrary, as the world moves closer than ever before to nuclear war, extending the Mutual Defence Agreement indefinitely is not only a further step in perpetuating Britain’s nuclear arsenal but also in promoting proliferation. The US exercises de facto control over Trident by virtue of the materials and know-how provided. Inevitably, this means too that the US exercises leverage over Britain’s foreign and security policy which is likely to be enhanced by the MDA amendment.

Money for War, but not for much else

This article first appeared on Labour Outlook

Fiscal responsibility dominated Labour’s election campaign, just as the £22 billion hole in public finances is now dominating government spending plans. Carol Turner asks why the Prime Minister’s ‘serious commitment’ to increasing military spending to 2.5% of GDP is the only promise that goes uncosted and unchallenged.

As revelations of a black hole in public finances and chaotic Conservative mismanagement emerge, the Big Question remains. How will the Labour government pay for its policies?

The two-child benefit cap stays; winter fuel payments are scrapped for all but the poorest pensioners; and social housing tenants face 10 years of above-inflation rent increases. Every day we’re warned that the Chancellor’s autumn statement will be grim.

Remarkable then that one manifesto commitment is absolved from scrutiny – the pledge to raise military spending to 2.5% of gross domestic product. Keir Starmer’s military budget commitment remains uncosted – an irksome outlier amongst the Chancellor’s non-negotiable fiscal rules.

There has been

• nothing said about how much it would cost

• nothing asked about where the money might come from, and

• absolutely nothing acknowledged about what cutbacks it’s likely to mean for other government departments.

Labour’s manifesto undertook to conduct a Strategic Defence Review (SDR) to ‘set out the path to spending 2.5% of GDP on defence’. Within two weeks in office Keir Starmer announced the SDR, conducted by Lord George Robertson, a former NATO Secretary-General, and overseen by Defence Secretary John Healey, who will report to parliament in the first half of 2025.

A foretaste of what 2.5% GDP will mean

Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) Director Paul Johnson was a rare exception to the silence on costing military spending. He questioned Rishi Sunak’s commitment to 2.5% in a Times article in April, objecting to ‘the misleading and opaque way in which the additional [military] spending was presented’.

‘When it wanted to make it look big, the government claimed it would boost spending by £75 billion; when it wanted to appear fiscally responsible, it claimed it would be cheap as chips, costing only £4.4 billion in 2028-29 and easily paid for by undoing some of the recent jump in civil service numbers. These figures, said Johnson, do not compute. The PCS union has suggested it will cost an extra £20bn, found by cutting 70,000 civil service jobs.

In June, the IFS published an estimate of changes in departmental budgets under spending plans for a new parliament. The first point to note is that unlike most departments – housing, transport, local government, etc– the MoD’s budget is ‘protected’, meaning inflation-proofed, alongside health, education, childcare, and overseas development.

The IFS chart below showed that unprotected government departments could take a budget hit of between 1.9% and 3.5%.

Military spending in context

A recent report by the MoD sets Starmer’s commitment to 2.5% military spending in perspective. The MoD budget already tops the NATO spending guideline for member states which was set at 2% of national GDP in 2006.  Britain has met this target every year since as has the USA, the only two members to do so.

The trends below suggest good reasons to consider reducing rather than increasing Britain’s military spending. Key take-aways from the MoD’s Finance and Economics Annual Statistical Bulletin 2024, include the following:

Britain’s current military spending

• UK’s military budget was 2.3% of GDP in 2023, amounting to between $73.5-$75bn.

• The amount the UK spends on the military increased by an average of 2.1% between 2014-2023, representing an extra $13.1 billion.

• In  2023, Britain was the 5th highest military spender in the world according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies; the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute ranked the UK 6th.

Britain’s record among NATO members 

• Britain is the 2nd largest spender in NATO, after the USA, with the 4th biggest population. UK military spending would be an even higher percentage were it calculated as per capita GDP.

• Total spending by NATO members made up 55% of global military expenditure in 2023, a combined total of US$1,305 billion and a 3% real terms increase on 2022.

• Only 10 of the 32 NATO members met the 2% guideline in 2023.

The longer-term picture

International military spending fell from the mid-1980s, as the Cold War drew to a close. It continued to decline in the 1990s, although UK and US military spending briefly increased as a result of the 1990-91 Gulf War.

The global decline ended in the early 2000s as a result of military activity in Afghanistan and Iraq, and has remained relatively stable since in the UK, France, and Germany. However, US defence spending has varied. As a result of military incursions in the Middle East, it rose sharply to peak at over 5% GDP in 2009, before dropping to 3.23% in 2023.

With few exceptions, military budgets have shown a more sustained increase in recent years. This is a trend which international institutions anticipate is likely to continue.

Global Campaign on Military Spending UK points out that new data from Stockholm shows a growth of 6.8% above inflation in 2023, to $2.44 trillion – the highest level since the end of the Cold War. The UK’s percentage increase was 7.9%, higher than some of the largest NATO members including the US and France.

Military spending is a political choice

Allocating resources to the MoD is a political choice like any other. Questioning priorities should be the concern of us all, and the costs of doing so transparent. As Richard Norton-Taylor puts it: ‘Military strategy should be based on an assessment of genuine risk. Ultimately, however, it is a matter of political choice.’

He uses the example of funding Trident – ‘at a cost of more than £200bn, a figure the MoD does not dispute’ – while deploying British troops to Afghanistan and Iraq without adequate body armour. Starmer’s commitment to Trident also comes without a price tag.

There are many well-documented examples of senior military personnel questioning the effectiveness of Britain’s nuclear weapons system, and of army, navy, and air force officers questioning the priority accorded their branch of the services. Veterans and veteran organisations highlight the lack of support for ex-soldiers, and politicians with military background have expressed concerns about the care of serving soldiers.

The UK government publishes a National Risk Register (NRR), based on National Security Risk Assessments which evaluate the most serious dangers facing the UK. Risks include accidental and malicious threats from abroad and at home, from cyber terrorism to natural disasters and environmental hazards.

The NRR offers a measure against which to assess the role of military, as opposed to other responses to the entirety of threats Britain faces. Military power has little impact on many – such as health pandemics and climate emergencies like floods and heatwaves. These considerations also need to be factored in when assessing how funding is allocated.

The SDR recently invited public contributions to the Review in the form of a call for evidence which closes on 30 September. Ability to participate is limited to short responses to a series of tightly controlled technical questions. There is no provision for – or expectation of – submissions outside the narrowly defined parameters set by the questions.

Restricting the ability to participate in the SDR process is in no one’s interest. The public and the media must be able to interrogate the rationality of the choice to raise military spending before the SDR reports next year. When it does you can be sure it will take us further along the government’s ‘trajectory to 2.5%’.